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WHY FEELINGS TRUMP FACTS: 




This article is a revised version of the 2018 Mackenzie Lecture that the author 
delivered at the University of Glasgow in association with the Stevenson Trust. It was 
therefore written for a broad public audience in an attempt to inform, entertain, 
stimulate and provoke in equal measure. At the time the author was Special Adviser 
to the House of Lords Select Committee on Citizenship and Civic Engagement but 
since then evidence of both increasing anti-political sentiment and the emergence of 
an increasingly populist political environment has increased. The emotional 
foundations of these phenomena, and particularly why feelings so often appear to 
trump facts, remains an arguably overlooked dimension of contemporary social and 
political science. This underlines the contemporary relevance of the thesis 
concerning ‘emotional disconnection’ that is developed and examined from a 




The more I look around the world and the challenges we face the more I think that 
students of politics (professors included) and practitioners of politics really need to 
understand why feelings matter and to engage at an emotional level. Simply put, I 
think it is an emotional disconnection that exists at the root of what Claudia Chwalisz 
(2015) describes as ‘the populist signal’. So in this lecture I want to explore anti-
politics, citizenship and emotion and I want to do this through a focus on: 
imagination and anchorage; hope and sacrifice; and a bus and a tree. This is not 
quite the focus that I had originally intended to place at the centre of this lecture. I 
was planning to – and, to some extent, still will – discuss what I term ‘the citizenship 
journey’ but in considering how to approach that topic I was struck by a strong sense 
that I was scratching at the surface of a far deeper and more profound issue. In 
many ways what might be termed ‘the citizenship challenge’ or ‘the democratic 
challenge’ revolves around increasing evidence of public disaffection with 
representative politics, on the one hand, and evidence of increasing social isolation 
and social segregation on the other. The Prime Minister’s decision to appoint a new 
Minister for Loneliness at the beginning of 2017 charged with developing a strategy 
to counter an ‘epidemic of loneliness’ was an inauspicious start to a year that ended 
with the government publishing a new democratic engagement strategy– Every 
Voice Matters: Building a Democracy That Works for Everyone.  
 
I’m not sure whatever happened to ‘every voice matters’ strategy but increasing 
evidence of political frustration and democratic dissatisfaction suggests that it failed 
(see Hansard Society, 2019). Vast sections of society feel that their voice does not 
matter.  In this regard it is arguably the review undertaken by Dame Louise Casey in 
2016 that examined social integration and equality of opportunity that shed most 
light on the increasingly threadbare emotional fabric of British society. It uncovered 
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a divided society in which black boys were still not getting jobs, white working class 
kids were, if anything, going backwards in the educational system and Muslim girls 
were often excelling at school but would then face poor employment opportunities. 
There were high levels of social and economic isolation in some places and cultural 
and religious practices in others that were holding people back, particularly women. 
Overall what the Casey Report identified was the ‘fraying fabric of our nation’ but 
there was also something deeper within the report in the form of an almost hidden 
dimension that existed between the lines of each and every page: an awareness of 
the emotional dynamics of contemporary citizenship and why feelings matter. 
Established populations in poorer areas felt a sense of unfairness, anger and 
frustration about how local council decisions were made over issues such as housing 
and school places; immigrant populations felt that their presence in these 
communities was resented; and British Muslims felt particularly under siege and 
suspicion. But what was particularly important about the Casey Report was its 
critique of the existing research that had been undertaken by both academics and 
the government. Too much research had been conducted that either sought to 
highlight positive trends or which focused on specific more quantifiable issues and 
which led to a focus on survey-style research. ‘[V]ery little research seemed to 
capture the mood of communities we met and listened to’ [emphasis added] the 
report concluded, 
 
[T[oo often the data analysis seems to be conducted at a level that is so high or 
general that no meaningful conclusions or policy decisions can be reached. This 
risks creating further disengagement by the general public and may increase 
perceptions that their views and opinions are being ignored and difficult issues 
swept under the carpet (p.64).  
 
This point resonated with me due to a long-running concern that my own research 
and writing was to some extent flawed due to a methodological approach that was 
generally institutionally focused and facts based. Where was my grasp of the 
emotional content of politics? To what extent was a focus on institution reform, 
democratic innovation and public policy seeking to respond to the symptoms of a 
major social challenge but not its underlying roots? As a social scientist I have been 
trained to operate with a currency of facts, but what if feelings trump facts?  The 
initial source for this question lay in title of Paula Ionide’s brilliant book - The 
Emotional Politics of Racism: How feelings trump facts in an era of colorblindness – 
but this rather haunting thought preoccupied my mind throughout the UKIP surge in 
2014 and 2015, it gripped me as I witnessed the rise of populist nationalism across 
Western Europe and the UK’s Brexit referendum in 2016, and it really haunted me as 
I watched the election of Donald Trump and to a lesser extent the Corbyn-mania 
surrounding the leader of the Labour Party in 2017 (see Flinders, 2018).  
 
My concern was not just that the emotional basis of politics seemed to be changing 
– politics has always been driven by emotions – but that the nature, intensity and 
basic incompatibility of those emotions was increasing. Maybe ‘why we hate politics’ 
– to use the title of Colin Hay’s 2007 book – was due to the existence of an 
emotional disconnection that demanded a very different political response if the 
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growing gap between the governors and the governed that surveys revealed was to 
be addressed. Indeed, populists were proving to be far more adept at forging an 
emotional connection with the public and through this were funnelling frustration 
and converting it into political support. At the same time my sense was that the 
social and political sciences had little to offer in terms of measuring, gauging or 
understanding why feelings mattered or what might be done. 
 
This is why I want to focus on why feelings and emotions matter when it comes to 
understanding contemporary debates concerning both citizenship and 
disengagement in this lecture. Although this is a lecture I have put off writing and 
presenting for several years (because examining emotions and feelings is 
methodologically tricky and politically perilous) the kick came in November 2006 and 
it was a big kick and it came from an unlikely source: the Turner Prize winning, Reith 
Lecturer Grayson Perry when he collected the Political Studies Association’s ‘Art and 
Culture’ Award’. During his acceptance speech he made this rather pointed but 
brilliant observation:  
 
I’m so honoured to be given this award by a room full of experts…. I’m not an expert. 
I’m an artist and I always feel like the academics are hovering behind me when I 
pontificate on anything … like they are going to catch me out. But I think the word 
“truth” is really interesting as we often talk about truth in terms of academic truth, 
statistical truth, empirical truth, scientific truth but very little do we actually talk 
about emotional truth. And I think that if the one thing that all the experts need to 
[improve] is their emotional literacy because what the liberal academic elite has done 
is let us down because they are not emotionally literate enough to understand what 
52% of the electorate was thinking – or feeling, should I say [when they voted to leave 
the EU]. There is a whole world out there that we need to have more empathy with 
even if we don’t like the results of what those kinds of feelings bring about. But I 
thank you for this award … from the experts…[!] 
 
 
This focus on emotions and feelings, on the relationship between feelings and 
behaviour, on empathy and – critically – on why feelings matter and may prove 
resistant to rational arguments based on the ‘facts’, ‘data’ or ‘research’ produced by 
experts stayed with me. The argument that Grayson was making, with his typical 
combination of flair and precision, was that feelings matter more than many experts 
(academics included) seem to understand. Feelings remain ‘real’ to the individual 
irrespective of how irrational or difficult to understand they might seem to external 
observers who do not feel the same way. And yet it is possible to suggest that 
political science, in general, and the analysis of political disaffection and anti-political 
sentiment, in particular, has - with only a few notable exceptions – generally failed to 
acknowledge why feelings matter, let alone explore how certain positive emotional 
dispositions might be cultivated.  
 
So in this lecture I want to do three things, in three parts, for three reasons.  
 
The first thing I want to do is explore Grayson Perry’s argument about a lack of 
emotional literacy within the ‘the liberal academic elite’ and I want to do this 
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through an argument that focuses on the concepts of imagination and anchorage. In 
this regard my argument is broadly that academe has lost the former while the 
public craves the latter. With this in mind the second aim of this lecture is to explore 
the thin seam of scholarship that not only demonstrates intellectual vibrancy and 
imagination but that can also be used to engage with the emotional foundations of 
anti-political, anti-establishment, anti-expert sentiment. I do this by focusing on two 
more concepts – hope and sacrifice.  And then I want to end with a very brief look at 
a bus and a tree. Or, more specifically, one bus route in a large post-industrial city 
and 5,732 street trees because I think talking about these fairly mundane elements 
of everyday life really does allow us to get to the emotional roots of contemporary 
concerns regarding citizenship and political disenchantment. Some might think this 
focus on a bus and a tree is a little odd but I really hope that at the end of the lecture 
you’ll be able to relate this focus to the core theme within this lecture of why feeling 
matter and emotional literacy. 
 
But why I have I made this decision to shift from a safe and very tangible focus on 
‘the citizenship journey’ for a far riskier expedition into the realm of emotions and 
feelings, frustration and fear? 
 
The first reason is that I am remaining true to the intellectual heritage and vision of 
William James Millar Mackenzie (Bill Mackenzie to his friends and colleagues) in 
whose name this annual lecture was established. Bill liked puzzles. He understood 
that politics, like life, was rarely tidy and as a result was best studied in conjunction 
with other subjects and that other subjects should always be aware of the political 
dimension. Originally schooled in the classics, he was a polymath – a generalist in the 
best sense - with the capacity to trespass across traditional disciplinary and 
professional boundaries and who promoted a culture of intellectual risk-taking and 
excitement that (as I will suggest in the first part of my lecture) has now to some 
extent been lost.  
 
‘The job (of political science) is to talk in an orderly manner, paying regard to 
consistency and verifiability, about a unique situation which is extremely complex 
and changes rapidly" he wrote in Politics and Social Science, his best-selling Penguin 
(1967). He did not believe that lectures or even articles should be too worked out. 
They should stimulate, suggest and leave students and readers to work things out for 
themselves.  I couldn’t’ help but reflect on how times had changed when I read 
Dennis Kavanagh’s obituary of Bill Mackenzie in The Independent (26 August 1996), 
‘A young colleague commented that a number of students did not fully understand 
[Prof. Mackenzie’s] lectures, but did not doubt that they were listening to a great 
man.’ It is doubtful that the emergence of the Teaching Excellence Framework will 
allow such creative pedagogic flexibility but the point is really that Bill’s intellectual 
talent rested on being able to see connections and to synthesise research that would 
otherwise have remained disconnected, and to suggest new areas for research. In 
this lecture I want to suggest a new way of looking at the familiar. The new way is 
through a lens or prism that emphasises the role of feelings and emotions, the 




The second reason I want to focus on feelings and emotions is for a more prosaic but 
no less important reason that stems from my role as special adviser to the House of 
Lords Select Committee on Citizenship and Civic Participation (see HL 118, 2018). 
During the course of its inquiry the committee received over 259 submissions of 
evidence, it questioned 58 witnesses during 21 oral evidence sessions and it 
undertook a number of visits to towns and cities afflicted by high levels of economic 
and social inequality. But throughout the inquiry I was wracked by a certain sense 
that despite the committee’s best efforts it has struggled to reveal or dissect exactly 
what role emotions or feelings play within debates concerning citizenship or civic 
engagement. There were, however, glimpses of rich insight when individuals spoke 
of their inner beliefs, their emotions and why they felt the way they did about their 
place in the world. A common insight, especially from younger people, was that the 
notion of citizenship – both as a concept and word – meant very little to them; it 
appeared quaint, out-dated, legalistic, formal, threatening and was often replaced 
with a focus on belonging. But exploring how and why these feelings matter proved 
incredibly difficult within the structures of a parliamentary inquiry and there is a 
need to reflect upon the broader implications of this challenge and how it might be 
addressed.  
 
The third and final reason I want to focus on emotions and feelings is that I want to 
use this lecture to test myself and to push me out of the intellectual comfort zone 
that I have worked within for almost a quarter of a century. However, when it comes 
to thinking about why feelings trump facts (if, indeed, they always do) within just 
one lecture I have no choice but to paint on a wide intellectual canvas with a fairly 
broad brush. But I hope that by doing so I will encourage other scholars to engage 
with the topic and through this fill in the fine detail and counter-points that cannot 
be made this evening. With this caveat in place we can begin this process through a 




I. IMAGINATION & ANCHORAGE 
 
When it comes to thinking about creativity, ambition, imagination and the social sciences it 
is difficult not to reach for a copy of C Wright Mills’ The Sociological Imagination (2000 
[1959]). Mills was a radical figure, both in relation to the nature of his research and in his 
critique of what he saw as ‘the drift’ of modern social science. His focus on what he termed 
‘the promise’ and ‘the trap’ have much to offer anyone interested in understanding why 
feelings matter ‘Nowadays men often feel that their private lives are a series of traps’ Mills 
noted in the opening line of The Sociological Imagination ‘They sense that within their 
everyday worlds, they cannot overcome their troubles, and in this feeling, they are often 
quite correct…In what period have so many men been so totally exposed at so fast a pace to 
such earthquakes of change? [emphasis added]’ What Mills’ labelled ‘the trap’ was 
therefore the risk that social change was outpacing the public’s capacity to make sense of 
the world; ‘the promise’, by contrast, related to the capacity of the social sciences to 
promote public understanding and to help individuals and communities understand their 
position in society and through this to assume some sense of control (i.e. to free them from 
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the trap). The role of the scholar was, through this interpretation, concerned with far more 
than the accumulation of knowledge but in helping individuals make sense of the changing 
world and their capacity for action within it. 
 
But this would only be achieved if academics could demonstrate the sociological imagination 
- ‘I hope my colleagues will accept the term ‘sociological imagination’… political scientists 
who have read my manuscript suggest ‘the political imagination’; anthropologists, ‘the 
anthropological imagination’ – and so on. The term matters less than the idea’ (pp.18-19 
fn.2) – in the sense of displaying an ability to pivot. That is, to shift from one perspective to 
another, from one discipline to another, from one topic to another and to ‘range from the 
most impersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate features of the human 
self – and see the relations between the two’ (p.7). Most of all, the most central element of 
the sociological imagination revolved around being able to see the relationship between 
personal troubles and public issues.  
 
Mills was a large, brusque, Texan cowboy – a ‘radical nomad’ (Hayden, 2006; see also 
Horowitz, 1983). He believed in ‘taking it big’ (Aronowitz, 2012) and that social scientists had 
a professional responsibility to the public. The sociological imagination is less a theory and 
more of a ‘quality of mind’ that understands the interplay of the individual and society. I 
would suggest that Bill Mackenzie possessed this quality of mind; this capacity to pivot and 
shift; range and dive; across and between traditions, disciplines and perspectives but in 
highlighting Mills’ Sociological Imagination my aim is simply to highlight how his work 
revolved around an awareness of emotional change and a critique of academe. ‘The trap’ 
that Mills placed at the centre of his analysis revolved around an explicit focus on feelings 
and emotions in the context of rapid social change. ‘The very shaping of history now 
outpaces the ability of men to orientate themselves in accordance with cherished values. 
And which values? Even when they do not panic, men often sense that older ways of feeling 
and thinking have collapsed and that newer beginnings are ambiguous to the point of moral 
stasis (1959 [2000], p.4)[emphasis added]’ To read Mills is therefore to come away with a 
clear sense of how large sections of the American working class felt ‘the misery of vague 
uneasiness’; how easy it is to read across to contemporary debates concerning ‘the cultural 
backlash’ (Norris and Inglehart, 2019), ‘the left behind’ (Wuthnow, 2018) or ‘le peripherique’ 
(Guilluy, 2019)? To be trapped was therefore to feel confused, fearful, anxious and adrift.  
 
But Mills was also keen to highlight a dimension of modern scholarship that could also 
arguably be interpreted as a trap - the professionalization of disciplines in ways that 
narrowed their focus and disconnected then from the public. In a precursor to 
contemporary debates concerning the ‘tyranny of impact’ and the demonstration of 
‘relevance’ (see Flinders, 2013a; 2013b; Flinders and Peters, 2013; Flinders and Pal, 2019). 
Mills sought to critique the bureaucratic techniques that had come to dominate the social 
sciences through methodological pretensions, theoretical fetishes, obscurantist conceptions, 
the ‘cult of the laboratory’ and a common focus on the trivial or minor instead of the serious 
or major. At a time when society most needed scholars with the sociological imagination 
Mills argued that the social and political sciences were least able to fulfil this role and were 
instead unwilling or unable to ‘admit the pretentious mediocrity of much current effort’. 
Moreover, many practitioners of social science seemed curiously reluctant to take up the 
challenges posed by the complexity of modern life; ‘Many, in fact, abdicate the intellectual 
and the political tasks of social analysis; others no doubt are simply not up to the role for 
which they are nevertheless cast’ (1959 [2000], p.21).  
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It would at this point be possible to use Mills’ stunning critique (a critique for which he was 
professionally never forgiven) as the reference point from which to trace the broad socio-
political perception that political science has for one reason or another become 
disconnected from broader society. This could move to proceed to Bernard Crick’s ‘A 
Rallying Cry to the University Professor of Politics’ (inspired as it was by his The American 
Science of Politics (1959) and feeding in to his classic In Defence of Politics (1964)). It might 
then change tack to focus on the creation of the Caucus for a New Political Science in the 
late 1960s and then make a leap forward to David Ricci’s brilliant but under-acknowledged 
The Tragedy of Political Science (1984). From here a talented disciplinary topographer might 
move to the ‘Perestroika’ debate in the United States and the quite different but not 
unrelated ‘Perestroika-lite’ debate across Europe before entering the twenty-first century 
and a veritable outpouring of literature on how as the social and political sciences became 
more ‘professional’ and ‘scientific’, so it became weaker in terms of both its social relevance 
and public accessibility. Key stepping-stones would have to include Bent Flyvbjerg’s Making 
Social Science Matter (2001), Stephen Toulmin’s Return to Reason (2003), Ian Shapiro’s 
Flight from Reality  (2005), Sanford Schram and Brian Caterino’s Making Political Science 
Matter (2006), B. Guy Peters et al.’s The Relevance of Political Science (2013), Mats Alvesson, 
Yannis Gabriel and Roland Paulsen’s Return to Meaning: A Social Science with Something to 
Say (2017) and Rainer Eisfeld’s Empowering Citizens, Engaging the Public: Political Science 
for the 21st Century.  
 
But all I’m really trying to underline is that Mills’ Sociological Imagination sought to highlight 
the need to understand emotions and feelings; for Mills modern life brought with it 
alienating social forces that cut the individual off from the conscious conduct of his 
behavior, thought and ultimately emotions. The promise of the social sciences lay in its 
capacity to help individuals make sense of the world and their place within it and, as such, 
Mills warned against a scientific model that prized what was quantifiable, easily measurable, 
objective, detached, neutral, value-free or that imposed false assumptions regarding 
rationality. (I cannot help but think about the Casey Report and its criticism of the existing 
research base for focusing on what is easily measurable rather than what is actually 
important.) And yet I would argue that Mills’ warnings largely went unheeded, many social 
sciences embarked along ‘a road to irrelevance’ and one casualty was arguably a clear focus 
on exactly why feelings and emotions matter (i.e. why feelings trump facts).  
 
Which leads me to a central pivot point and the need for us to use a little imagination. My 
argument here is that at the roots of Mills’ work was an implicit focus on the concept of 
anchorage in the sense of a clear and robust sense of connection between an individual and 
the broader social milieu – a sense of feeling adrift in the world. Which leads me to shift my 
focus from Mills to one of his intellectual disciples – Zygmunt Bauman. Frail, small and 
quietly spoken – the only thing that Zygmunt shared with Mills apart from their intellectual 
overlap was a love of smoking pipes – my argument exists in three parts. First, Bauman’s 
focus on the concept of ‘liquid modernity’ (2000) provided a searing focus on the loss of 
anchorage amongst increasing large publics. At the heart of this focus on liquidity, on the 
rupturing of traditional social bonds, was an awareness of its emotional dimensions and this 
is reflected in his books Liquid Love (2003), Liquid Fear (2006), Liquid Evil (2016) and many 
others. What does this focus on liquidity or ‘liquid modernity’ actually mean? Put simply, it 
relates to change within society and how change is occurring more and more rapidly in the 
(late) ‘modern’ world and in ways that are eroding traditional social relationships and setting 
people adrift (or as Mills might say ‘feeling trapped’). Different types of change across each 
and every dimension of modern life – work, relationships, communities, religion, war…even 
elements of life that once appeared relatively simple and straightforward, such as gender 
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definition, are suddenly more complex and fluid - ‘but what unites them all is precisely their 
fragility, temporariness, vulnerability and inclination to constant change. To ‘be modern’ 
means to modernize – compulsively, obsessively; not so much just ‘to be’, let alone to keep 
its identity intact, but forever ‘becoming’, avoiding completion, staying under-defined. Each 
new structure which replaces the previous one as soon as it is declared old-fashioned and 
past its use-by date is only another momentary settlement – acknowledged as temporary 
and ‘until further notice’…. change is the only permanence, and uncertainty the only 
certainty’. This uncertainty and ambiguity, I want to argue, comes at an emotional price and 
manifests itself in a yearning for stability or anchorage.  
 
Anyone who has worked in a British university in recent years may well agree with this focus 
on constant reform and change (think REF, TEF, KEF) but there are two points to tease out of 
this point – one political, one academic. The political is something we will examine later but 
revolves around how political structures (political parties, bureaucracies, etc.) that were 
born and designed in much simpler, more solid, times must now somehow adapt to cope 
with fluidity but too often appear like dinosaurs wandering aimlessly across the political 
savannah like prehistoric sleepwalkers who don’t really understand where they are going 
and why. (In fact, the leaner, meaner more flexible parties tend to be the smaller more 
aggressive populist insurgent parties.) But there is an underlying argument about the role of 
scholars and the role of scholarship in society and a critique concerning a lack of emotional 
intelligence arising from a certain brand of professionalization. Bauman’s sociology is above 
all a sociology of imagination, of feelings, of human relations – love, fear, despair 
indifference, insecurity, insensitivity – and of intimate lived experience. Bauman was an 
admitted methodological eclecticist: empathy and sensitivity were much more important to 
him than methodological or theoretical purity (on this point see Donskis, 2013). 
 
It would at this point be possible to ‘pivot’ into a discussion of the work of  Michael Burawoy 
and the debate concerning ‘public sociology’ (see, for example, 2004); or to engage in a 
discussion concerning the growth of ‘the precariat’ (Standing, 2014) and the changing nature 
of work; or Danny Dorling’s arguments concerning The Equality Effect (2017); but all I want 
to do from this focus on the work of Mills and Bauman is to suggest that their focus on 
imagination, in terms of intellectual empathy, and anchorage, in terms of the emotional 
impact of social change, provides significant leverage and insight in terms of understanding 
why feelings (might) trump facts and why this matters to contemporary debates concerning 
citizenship and political disaffection. Put very simply, if you live in a pit village without a pit, 
a fishing port without fish, a steel city without steel, a railway town without a railway, a 
seaside resort without tourists or a shipbuilding city without many ships to build - to 
paraphrase Ruth Davidson (2017) - then how you feel as dictated by your lived-everyday-
experience (‘the world as they see it from the window of their favourite café or pub’ as 
Grayson Perry put it) is unlikely to be changed by the research-based data-driven opinion of 
‘the experts’. Which leads me to focus on the work of two more scholars and two emotions 
– hope and sacrifice. 
 
 
II. HOPE & SACRIFICE 
 
The previous section strode across quite a wide analytical terrain. It argued that the 
concepts of imagination and anchorage, drawing from the work of Mills and Bauman 
(respectively) offered a double-benefit in the sense that they highlighted the role of 
emotions and feelings in politics while also offering a critique of the social and political 
sciences for drifting away from a deeper social connection. In relation to politics and 
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emotions I would generally argue that despite the existence of an ‘affective turn’ within the 
social sciences, in general, and particularly within citizenship studies, the study of why and 
how feelings about politics matter remains under-developed. I’m not saying that the link 
between emotions and politics has not been the focus of sustained analysis – to do so would 
be to overlook the major contributions of scholars including Sara Ahmed, Ernst Bloch, 
Martha Nussbaum, Raia Provhovnik, Paul Hoggett and Emma Hutchinson – but I am 
suggesting that the link between emotions and politics, or more specifically why feelings 
matter, has not been thoroughly interrogated when it comes to understanding the rise of 
political dis-affection and anti-political sentiment (and especially so within political science). 
Fortunately this is an argument that has recently been made with great precision, insight 
and – dare I say it ‘imagination’ - by Laura Jenkins (2018) and my aim here is simply to 
highlight and develop three features of her position.  
 
The first point is that it would be wrong to suggest the burgeoning literature on ‘disaffected 
democrats’ is feelingless or that is lacks an emotional foundation. It generally charts a rather 
barren political landscape that is defined by feelings of distrust and contempt for politicians, 
political institutions and political processes. Negative, pessimistic and cynical feelings seem 
to define the modern condition and this is reflected in the title of recent books –The Life and 
Death of Democracy? (Keane, 2011), Saving Democracy from Suicide (Lee, 2012), Ruling the 
Void (Mair, 2013), Hatred of Democracy (Ranciere, 2014), Democracy Against Itself (Chou, 
2014), The End of Representative Politics (Tormey, 2015), Against Democracy (Brennan, 
2016), How Democracies Die (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018), How Democracy Ends (Runciman, 
2018), Can Government Do Anything Right? (Roberts, 2018), Democracy and its Crisis 
(Grayling, 2018), Crises of Democracy (Przeworski, 2019) – but what tends to be missing is 
analyses that get beneath the skin of why these feelings are actually so endemic. Put slightly 
differently, survey research is usually the primary methodology with case studies, focus 
groups and interviews sometimes deployed to add qualitative texture and tone. What are 
too often missing are any deep immersive observational analyses that place the scholar at 
the heart of the disengaged communities they seek to understand. Nearly three decades 
ago, Richard Fenno (1990, p.128) commented that ‘not enough political scientists are 
presently engaged in observation'. Little, I would suggest, has changed. A recent review by 
Kaposzewski et al. concluded that ‘political science has yet to embrace ethnography and 
participant observation wholeheartedly’ (2015, p.234). There is – Auyero and Joseph (2007, 
p.9; See also Boxswell et al. 2018) suggest - a ‘double absence: of politics in ethnographic 
literature and of ethnography in the study of politics’. I don’t know enough about 
ethnography to discern if the former point it true but I am confident enough to support the 
latter argument about the lack of ethnography in the study of politics.  
 
But if the existing research base highlights ‘a problem’ in the sense of the existence of 
negative emotions and disenchantment towards politics then it also – in Jenkins’ analysis – 
tends to highlight ‘a solution’ in the sense of increasing the public understanding of politics 
and, through this, seeking to temper, deflate or, at the very least, manage the public 
expectations so that a sense of disappointment or failure does not become almost 
inevitable. ‘Many citizens fail to appreciate that politics in the end involves the collective 
imposition of decisions, demands a complex communication process and generally produces 
messy compromise’ Gerry Stoker (2006, p.10) argues ‘Politics is designed to disappoint – 
that is the way that the process of compromise and reconciliation works.’ This is a mode of 
response that can be traced back at least to Bernard Crick’s classic In Defence of Politics 
(‘politics cannot make all sad hearts glad’) and then through a celebrated seam of 
scholarship that includes Andrew Gamble’s Politics and Fate (2000), Colin Hay’s Why We 
Hate Politics (2007), Matthew Flinders Defending Politics (2013), Roslyn Fuller’s, In Defence 
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of Democracy (2019), and in many ways chimes with Arlie Russell Hochschild’s The Managed 
Heart (2003) in the sense that by reducing our expectations we may protect ourselves from 
later disappointment. (The smart politician adopting this logic might reverse the common 
chain of events by promising very little in their campaign but then over-achieve when in 
office....). The risk, however, that Jenkins places at the heart of her critique is that tempering 
expectations may perversely undermine some emotions which motivate the more positive 
engagement and behaviour that scholars seek to inspire. Lowering expectations may lead to 
states of pessimism and that strong emotional inspiration for political action - ‘Yes we can!’ - 
could be lost. Moreover, seeking to lower expectations, Jenkins suggests, is ‘a somewhat 
unemotional, rationalised solution to a public emotional problem’.  
 
Without the bold imagination, hopeful rhetoric, raw emotions, high expectations and 
passionate struggle of prominent campaigners facing significant risks, obstacles and suffering, 
is it likely that the suffrage would have been extended, slavery abolished, national 
independence achieved for colonised states, apartheid defeated in South Africa and so on? 
 
The third and final insight that I want to harvest from Jenkins’ work is therefore a focus not 
on the hopeless but on hope itself – and the cultivation of hope – as a response to political 
disengagement and disenchantment. Hope is not seen as romantic or dreamy but as 
simultaneously ‘self-soothing and sustaining’ and (critically): ‘practising hope invites us to 
shed emotions: to lose fear and despair’. There is a link between this theoretical point and 
the more practical focus on ‘the civic journey’ which the House of Lords Select Committee 
on Citizenship and Civic Engagement sought to explore in 2018 (mentioned above). The 
committee, and many other participants in the debate, were concerned with promoting 
citizenship and embedding civic values in ways that promoted social integration and 
militated against division. As a result, it explored issues including citizenship education in 
schools, the responsibility of faith schools to promote multi-cultural understanding, how to 
ensure that home educated children possessed a rounded worldview, and the role of the 
National Citizen Service (See HL 118, 2018). But what Jenkins asks is whether we need to 
spend more time cultivating positive emotions in the manner that Martha Nussbaum (2001) 
has suggested through her focus on how love, sympathy and compassion incite justice and 
enlarge an individual’s imagination and ‘circle of concern’. To some extent I think that this 
was at the core of Bernard Crick’s ambitious report on citizenship education that was 
published exactly twenty years ago - ‘We aim at no less than a change in the political culture 
of this country both nationally and locally’ – but was never really implemented with the vim 
and vigour that was required (Advisory Group on Citizenship, 1998). Crick’s vision was 
concerned with recognising ugly and negative feelings and cultivating positive collective 
belief, even hope. So I’m intuitively drawn to Jenkin’s arguments not only about the need for 
a better understanding of why feelings matter but also about the public cultivation of 
positive emotions but I cannot help but think that these good intentions risk crashing down 
upon the procrustean realities of contemporary politics if we fail to acknowledge the 
existence of embedded barriers and it is this focus on barriers, walls and obstacles that leads 
me to pivot again from ‘hope’ to ‘sacrifice’. 
 
The buckle I want to use is Pankaj Mishra’s wonderful book The Age of Anger (2018) because 
it reveals not only how history tends to rhyme but also how the contemporary condition is 
driven by the manner in which social, political, and technological shifts have cast many 
millions of people adrift, uprooted from tradition in a manner that resonates with the 
arguments of Mills and Bauman regarding ‘the trap’ and ‘liquidity’. The promise of freedom, 
stability and prosperity is delivered to a chosen few but not the masses. The ranks of the 
disaffected understandably feel angry, disillusioned and ‘left behind’, susceptible to 
demagogues and populists. Those who seem to have sacrificed the most in terms of 
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anchorage, stability and risk seem to have gained the least in an increasingly precarious 
upside-down world.  
 
But when I think of Brexit and Trump I cannot help but think ‘How can so many people get it 
so wrong?’ But maybe this knee-jerk question reveals more about my lack of emotional 
intelligence…my emotional illiteracy… and the need for me to try and understand emotional 
truths.  One way of doing this is to explore the findings of those rare studies that have 
(generally beyond political science and generally beyond the UK) begun to generate a fuller 
understanding of emotion in politics through thick, immersive, observational research. This 
is a relatively new kind of political literature inspired by Thomas Frank’s What’s the Matter 
with Kansas? (2004) and would include texts such as Joe Bageant’s Deer Hunting with Jesus: 
Dispatches from America’s Class War (2007), Kate Zernike’s Boiling Mad: Inside Tea Party 
America (2010), and Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson’s The Tea Party and the 
Remaking of Republican Conservatism (2012). These are intricate and intimate studies of 
political groups with an emphasis on feelings, beliefs and emotions and if Vytautas Kavolis 
was correct when he held sociology, and the social sciences in general, to be ‘a field bereft 
of melody’ (quoted in Donskis, 2013, p.2) then this genre of writing represents a melodious 
counter-example. Stylistically they are not written as academic tracts but as accessible 
journeys of discovery in the manner of Margaret Mead’s Coming of Age in Samoa (1928) or 
Clifford Geertz’s Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight (1973). Our present-day 
investigators – and here I owe a huge debt to the American novelist and essayist Nathanial 
Rich - file intimate reports from exotic locales like Flagstaff, Arizona, and Middletown, Ohio, 
where they embed themselves among the natives. Amongst this body of work Arlie Russell 
Hochschild’s Strangers in their own Land (2016) provides arguably the most insightful 
account of why feelings matter. Hochschild is a left-leaning, grey-haired, mild-mannered 
sociologist from Berkeley (another big fan of C Wright Mills) who travels to southwestern 
Louisiana to observe the tea party in the geographical core of its misery and anti-
establishment hellfire rage. Hochschild’s aim was to develop exactly that emotionally 
literacy, to expose those emotional truths that Grayson Perry had encouraged scholars to 
grasp in the UK in the wake of the Brexit referendum. In preparation she rereads Ayn Rand, 
author of the classic right-leaning and libertarian works The Fountainhead (1943) and Atlas 
Shrugged (1957) but fails to encounter anyone who shows the slightest interest in literature 
(but at a bookstore in Lake Charles [Pop. 70,000, main industry – petrochemical plants and 
oil refineries] she finds that three aisles are reserved for Bibles). 
 
And yet the critical element I want to take from Hochschild in order to develop our focus on 
why feelings matter - and particularly in light of Jenkins’ focus on how more hope-full 
positive feelings might be cultivated – is her awareness of three emotional drivers or 
dynamics: what she calls the ‘Empathy Wall’; ‘the Great Paradox’; and the ‘deep story’.  
  
The Empathy Wall separates political groups, preventing deep understanding of the other 
side. ‘Is it possible,’ she asks, ‘without changing our beliefs, to know others from the inside, 
to see reality through their eyes, to understand the links between life, feeling, and politics; 
that is, to cross the empathy wall? I thought it was.’ But while Hochschild tries to tear down 
her empathy wall, the Tea Partiers speak fervidly of trying to erect a great wall on the 
Mexican border. And yet at the same time there appears to be a major paradox – ‘a Great 
Paradox’ – that reveals around the mismatch between the evidence or facts, on the one 
hand, and how the white working class in Southwest Louisiana feel about what’s in their 
best interests.   
 
Across the country, red states [Republican] are poorer and have more teen mothers, more 
divorce, worse health, more obesity, more trauma-related deaths, more low-birth-weight 
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babies, and lower school enrollment. On average, people in red states die five years earlier 
than people in blue states. Indeed, the gap in life expectancy between Louisiana (75.7) and 
Connecticut (80.8) is the same as that between the United States and Nicaragua (p.9).  
 
The poorer and more conservative you are, the worse off you are likely to be and the sooner 
you are likely to die. This holds even on the county level. Yet the very people most damaged 
by conservative policies in the United States are most likely to vote for them. In recent years 
comparative studies of the rise of right-wing populist nationalism have generally offered two 
explanations. The first is the economic inequality perspective that highlights overwhelming 
evidence of powerful trends toward greater income and wealth inequality in the West, an 
increasingly precarious economic existence and concern about inflows of migrants and 
refugees. If you are older, less educated or live beyond thriving cities then securing well-paid 
or long-term employment is increasingly difficult; and if you feel you have little to lose why 
not take a chance on those who seem to offer simple solutions to complex problems? This 
argument flows into a second and related explanation for deviant voting the cultural 
backlash theory. This sees the rise of populism and anti-political sentiment as in large part a 
reaction against progressive cultural change. Public support for progressive values such as 
cosmopolitanism, feminism, environmentalism, etc., were to some extent based on the 
security delivered through post-war economic growth. In a period of global economic 
austerity the ‘cultural escalator’ appears to have stopped or even to have gone into reverse 
in some countries as public commitment to progressive values has waned. ‘The silent 
revolution of the 1970s’ Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris (2016, p.5) conclude ‘appears to 
have spawned an angry and resentful counter-revolutionary backlash today.’ The cultural 
backlash theory would therefore dovetail with Jonathan Haidt’s argument in The Righteous 
Mind (2013) that Tea Party voters are not misled but instead care more deeply about 
cultural values than economic principles.  
 
But back to the bayou and Hochschild in Louisiana and her view that although both of these 
theories – the economic and the cultural - have merit ‘I found one thing missing in them 
all—a full understanding of emotion in politics. What, I wanted to know, did people want to 
feel, think they should or shouldn’t feel, and what do they feel about a range of issues?’  
 
How, then, do Tea Party voters feel? They’re angry, bitter, resentful—that much is obvious. 
Hochschild goes further, however. She develops for them what in brand marketing is 
referred to as the “back story,” a story that provides a unifying emotional logic to a set of 
beliefs. She calls it the “deep story.” The deep story that Hochschild creates for the Tea Party 
is a parable of the white American Dream. It begins with an image of a long line of people 
marching across a vast landscape. The Tea Partiers—white, older, Christian, predominantly 
male, many lacking college degrees—are somewhere in the middle of the line. They trudge 
wearily, but with resolve, up a hill. Ahead, beyond the ridge, lies wealth, success, dignity. Far 
behind them the line is composed of people of color, women, immigrants, refugees. As 
pensions are reduced and layoffs absorbed, the line slows, then stalls. 
 
An even greater indignity follows: people begin jumping the queue. Many are those who had 
long stood behind them—blacks, women, immigrants, refugees – are allowed to cut in, 
aided by the federal government. Next an even more astonishing figure jumps ahead of 
them: a brown pelican, the Louisiana state bird, ‘fluttering its long, oil-drenched wings.’ 
Thanks to environmental protections, it is granted higher social status than, say, an oil-rig 
worker. The pelican, writes Hochschild, needs clean fish to eat, clean water to dive in, oil-
free marshes, and protection from coastal erosion. That’s why it’s in line ahead of you. But 
really, it’s just an animal and you’re a human being. Meanwhile the Tea Partiers are made to 
feel less than human. They find themselves reviled for their Christian morality and the 
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“traditional” values they have been taught to honor from birth. Many speak of “sympathy 
fatigue,” the sense that every demographic group but theirs receives sympathy from liberals. 
“People think we’re not good people if we don’t feel sorry for blacks and immigrants and 
Syrian refugees,” one Tea Partier tells Hochschild. “But I am a good person and I don’t feel 
sorry for them.” Hochschild is explaining that people with whom she has little in common, 
and whose political outlook she objects, have logical, rational reasons for engaging in the 
way they do. Her version of the deep story goes like this: 
 
You are a stranger in your own land. You do not recognise yourself in how others see you. It is a 
struggle to feel seen and honoured. And to feel honoured you have to feel – and [be] seen as – 
moving forward. But through no fault of your own, and in ways that are hidden, you are slipping 
backward. 
 
When Hochschild tells her deep story to some of the people she’s come to know, they greet 
it rapturously. “You’ve read my mind,” says one. She concludes that they do not vote in their 
economic interest but in their ‘emotional self-interest.’ What other choice do they have? 
Hochschild reveals the emotional soul of those that feel ‘left behind’, who yearn for a sense 
of belonging, for anchorage and acceptance…who feel strangers, not citizens, in their own 
land. This is why feelings matter – because they provide a foundation for a worldview that 
can prove incredibly resistant to arguments based on facts, science or expert-opinion.  
 
The critical element and in many ways the whole point of this lecture is to emphasise that 
when viewed in the context of these people’s lives the politics of Trump and of the Tea Party 
has come to make rational sense – it is an emotional truth. What drives people’s views on 
specific topics – like immigration, environmental regulations, healthcare – is unlikely to be 
any rational weighing-up of the evidence but how a particular argument or view of the world 
connects with people’s sense of themselves, where they are heading and their way of life. 
Feelings trump facts and at play here are specific ‘feeling rules’, to paraphrase Hochschild. 
The right seeks release from post-war liberal notions of what they should feel – happy for 
the gay newlyweds, sad at the plight of refugees, worried about the environment, etc. A 
counter-revolutionary backlash, especially among the older generations, white men and less 
educated sectors has rejected the displacement of traditional family values by post-
industrial values (see Inglehart 1997; 1990). The left, however, dismiss the rejection of 
orthodox progressive ‘feeling rules’ as mere prejudice and intolerance that, in itself, 
arguably displays a lack of empathy with those in insecure employment, low wages and little 
social protection. They just don’t seem able to understand the mood of communities or the 
existence of specific feelings. Those on the left seem (bizarrely) unable to scale the empathy 
wall. This brings me to conclude my lecture with an attempt to ground this rather wide-
ranging discussion with a very quick focus on, amongst other things, a bus and a tree. 
 
 
III. A BUS & A TREE 
 
The aim of this lecture has been to explore the relationship(s) between anti-politics, 
citizenship and emotions. It has attempted to understand why feelings matter and this led us 
through a focus on imagination and anchorage and then hope and sacrifice before coming to 
a focus on the existence of ‘empathy walls’ and the rejection of dominant ‘feeling rules’ by 
sections of the public. In this regard I think Hochschild’s concept of ‘deep stories’ provides a 
valuable lens into feelings of social discontent that must be acknowledged if the challenges 
of social fragmentation, inequality and political disaffection are truly to be addressed. In 
many ways these ‘deep stories’ provide a sense of emotional anchorage and a frame 
through which to understand a changing world. But in this final section I want to return to 
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my focus on Mills’ sociological imagination in order to move from the macro to the micro 
and to ground this analysis back in the UK and to bring it down to a very basic ‘everyday’ 
level. What’s interesting about this focus on feelings and emotions is that it adds a new 
dimension to contemporary debates concerning social change and social division. More 
specifically, the emergence of a major new fault-line within British politics that emphasises 
education, age and location as the dominant explanatory variables behind behaviour and 
attitudes (see Table 1).  
 
>>>Insert Table 1 here <<< 
 
What’s interesting about this ‘two tribes’ thesis is the manner in which each of the tribes 
tends to operate from a very different ‘deep story’. One looks forward for inspiration, the 
other looks back. The feelings of both tribes therefore stems from arguably incompatible 
positions and offer very different ‘feeling rules’. This is exactly why Emily Thornberry’s 
photo-linked tweet during the Rochester and Strood by-election in November 2014 caused 
such a controversy. To many working classes communities it epitomised a broader feeling 
that the Labour Party had become a cosmopolitan elite that no longer understood - and 
even mocked – tradition, pride and patriotism.  
 
With the benefit of hindsight what was particularly noteworthy about the ‘Leave’ campaign 
was the manner in which relatively simplistic and emotionally charged statements could 
forge a powerful and ultimately successful connection with both longstanding British cultural 
idiosyncrasies vis-à-vis the EU and also more recent economic and cultural social anxieties, 
notably concerning immigration. Put slightly differently, the ‘Leave’ campaign managed to 
tap into a ‘deep story’ that many people still believed in. Nostalgia, once initially defined as 
an illness, now became a chronically under-estimated political force. As Alan Finlayson 
(2017) noted, Brexit became a campaign of ‘anti-political politics organised around 
resentment at past losses and scepticism about promised futures’. The sense of a loss of 
tradition, a mythical integrity, an eviscerated global status, a romanticised past plus a 
nativist and nationalist anxiety were all set against the perceived excesses of a distant 
European elite. Afua Hirsch’s Brit(ish) (2018) has developed this theme and is to some extent 
supported by the drift of British popular culture with its promotion of a dominant ‘deep 
story’ from which powerful feelings and emotions still emanate. Think about the most 
successful recent films (Dunkirk, Darkest Hour), think about The Crown on Netflix, the 
popularity of Poldark or Downton Abbey or even Horrible Histories.  And yet the role of 
nostalgia as an emotional safety blanket is largely dismissed by many mainstream parties on 
the left while populists flick powerful emotive triggers that play to the ‘deep story’ of a 
glorious (immigrant free) past. Take, for example, the hometown of my father (before he 
moved south to Swindon in search of work) – Doncaster.  
 
Doncaster is a railway town that has had to cope with de-industrialisation and where people 
have had to cope with and give meaning to the changes affecting their lives. In the space left 
by the dissolution of industrialism, as Cathrine Thorleifsson (2016) has revealed, 
communities nostalgically invoked the industrial past to cope with existential insecurity. 
Some called upon the lost empire while others turned to exclusionary Englishness as the 
solution to current hardship and grievances. In 2015 UKIP strategically located their annual 
conference in the white-majority working-class town and tapped into local anxieties and 
local history by promising to secure a prosperous future for British nationals in the extractive 
industries. What Thorleifsson calls ‘the UKIP code’ was carefully designed to tap into the 
town’s ‘deep story’, in this case through ‘coal nationalism’ that was linked to industry and 
feelings of stability and belonging. Feeling nostalgic is therefore powerful emotion that can 
act as a meaning-making resource (see Routledge, et al. 2012; Baldwin and Landau, 2014). 
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I quite like nostalgia. I can still remember spending my summer holidays in Doncaster during 
the late 1980s. Fishing at Cusworth Hall and riding around on the Brown and Cream buses 
that were heavily subsidized as part of the Social Republic of South Yorkshire to a maximum 
fare of two pence. And yet even here there is a link between my own rosy memories and 
Hochschild’s research in the Deep South of United States. The ‘Tea Party Code’ was carefully 
designed to tap into the American dream, as was the rhetoric of Donald Trump. It was a 
shrill performance of emotionalism that is in itself very different to the empathy and 
emotional intelligence that Grayson Perry warmly promotes. I cannot help but wonder if the 
Corbyn-surge of 2017 was based upon an emotional connection or populist emotionalism 
but it’s interesting that Theresa May and Hillary Clinton were both portrayed as lacking 
emotional warmth and criticized for promoting facts not feelings (for a discussion see 
Flinders, 2018). And yet with C Wright Mills’ Texan drawl ringing in my ears and telling me to 
conclude I want to make the jump from the Deep South to South Yorkshire in one step: 
Hochschild tells us that life inequalities remain rife from state to state with people in red 
states dying on average five years earlier than people in blue states; but in Sheffield we have 
a bus - the No. 83 - which runs from the suburb of Ecclesfield and then through Southey 
Green, Shirecliffe, Pitsmoor, city centre, Hunters Bar and ends in either Bents Green or 
Fulwood. The trip takes about forty minutes and will cost £1.80. But the average life 
expectancy for those that live around the beginning of your trip, as Dany Dorling (2017) has 
shown, is ten years less than those who live at the end. The bus trip really does tell a tale of 
two cities or two tribes – one rich, one poor; the ‘anywheres’ and the ‘somewheres’ - 
differing ‘deep stories’ but all feeling angry about politics for different reasons. But similar 
bus routes that track inequality can be found all over the country. Many people feel 
strangers in their own land.  
 
That’s it. My story about a tree, with its focus on feelings and felling, emotional roots and 
empathy walls, will have to wait (but see Flinders and Wood, 2018). But I cannot help but 
remember that in his long essay about the life of Bill Mackenzie Richard Rose notes how Bill 
closed his memoirs with a quote from T. S. Elliot’s Little Gidding - the fourth and final poem 
of Eliot’s Four Quartets (1943) – ‘…To arrive where we started/And know the place for the 
first time’. And we have at least come full circle and back where we started with a focus on 
the need to better understand why feelings matter. As Nussbaum argues in Political 
Emotions (2014, p.10), we are not automatons who will be persuaded by the most rational 
political arguments and principles, we are enthused, touched, affected and moved by things 
to which we establish significance; thus, we need to care about our visions and our goals. 
The question I want to leave you with is this: Where are those with the capacity to scale the 
empathy wall, who can understand the concerns of those they may not agree with, who can 
transcend competing narratives of victimhood, anger and rage and who – most of all – 
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